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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

VALUE AND FACT[1]

THE problem which is implied in the title has two sides, because we use the term "value" in two different meanings. From R. B. Perry we have learnt that when we deal with value we must clearly distinguish between two levels of discourse. To start with the lower level: In a general sense the death of a competitor will be a value to *some* persons, and so will revenge or undeserved praise. Also, some individuals tend to like blond individuals of the other sex, some find the taste of buttermilk very pleasant, and some are repelled by the smell of tobacco. So long as we remain on this first level of value there is no reason why we should not continue the list with instances like these: I must keep my promise, and, It is bad to deceive one's friend in order to gain some personal advantage. Value in a generic sense, i.e., value mainly defined by its contrast with neutral facts, is an ingredient which the latter examples have in common with the former. But many philosophers feel that nevertheless two issues must here be sharply separated. On the lower level of value theory, they would say, there is no reference to validity or to obligation. Value experience itself, however, forces us to rise to a higher level, and to segregate from values in general a more specific group whose values claim to be binding. Once we are on this level, a secondary evaluation of values in general becomes necessary in terms of binding value. Many values are positive on both levels. On the higher level it remains, for instance, a good thing if we like nice people. But some values which have *prima facie* a positive sign assume a negative sign from the higher point of view. It seems to be generally acknowledged that revenge is in this class. Again, other values appear now as neutral. Gentlemen are under no obligation to prefer blondes; on the other hand, they can not be blamed if they do so.

[1] The author wishes to remark that the present version of this paper differs at several points from the original which he read on November 28, 1943, for the Symposium on "Value in a World of Fact," at the Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences, New School for Social Research. In this corrected version free use has been made of the criticism which members of the audience, particularly Professor E. Nagel and Professor C. G. Hempel, raised in the dicussion.

In the following I propose to concentrate on value in the general sense of the word. The problem of valid value will only be discussed so far as seems necessary to prevent a fairly common misunderstanding. There are two reasons for the restriction. In the first place, it has become customary to ignore certain difficulties which concern value in its modest general sense. In the second place, certain errors which disturb our thought on the higher level are not peculiar to this level but only persist because they are first committed on the lower level. Both reasons make it advisable for one to refrain from an immediate discussion of valid value.

According to the scientists no object and no event in nature has value characteristics. It does not matter whether we refer to value in general or to binding value; the whole genus is excluded from the description of nature. Physical objects merely exist, and physical events merely occur: such is the verdict of natural science. On the other hand, every bit of human conduct, from trifles up to the present war, involves value as its most important content. This constitutes our problem.

A few hundred years ago there was no such problem. Everybody knows that in Aristotelian physics value concepts were freely applied to nature, and that remnants of this attitude are clearly discernible in the statements of great scientists as late as the seventeenth century. It is nevertheless true that at the present time a physicist would risk his reputation if he were to use value concepts in relation to his subject-matter. At the same time the dualism to which I just referred is nowhere more striking than in the case of the scientist himself. He will scorn as ridiculous any suggestion that value might reside in physical facts. But his conduct as a scientist implies firm belief in a whole set of values. Quite apart from practical applications, knowledge and research are to him matters of tremendous value. The objectivity of science, clearness of reasoning, and honesty in the treatment of observational data are all values about which he has stern convictions. Paradoxically enough, even the absence of value from the subject-matter of science impresses him as a great value which he will defend at all costs.

We would not have to be particularly disturbed by this attitude if it had no further consequences. But during the past three hundred years science has for good reasons gained a prestige with which few other human enterprises can compete. As a result large sections of civilized mankind have learned to look at things with the eyes of science. They have also adopted the values of science, for instance, the conviction that a keen mind with strong theoretical interests is best applied if it is applied to science. Thus the most

intelligent men of generations went into science, and consequently forgot about the problems of value. They *had* value; but apart from its absence in nature they were not concerned with the topic. Under the same influence philosophers, who actually kept outside, did far more penetrating work about our access to the outside world and related problems than they did about questions of value. Is it astonishing that in a period which had this orientation the study of value degenerated? After all, value was not merely ignored in science. Rather, complete absence of value from any scientific material was now a fact of which all scientists were firmly convinced. Therefore, when new disciplines developed which proudly adopted the ways of science, not only scientific techniques in a positive sense spread far and wide, but also the scientists' dislike of value as a component of any subject-matter. This happened in biology, in psychology, but to a degree also in social science. Thus during the nineteenth century value tended to become a matter of contempt, i.e., a negative value, among the intellectuals. I remember distinctly that as a young student of science I once expressed my condescending sympathy with an historian of art because in his field the poor fellow had to put up with value. It is obvious that this sophomoric behavior merely reflected a view which was then widely held. No less a man that Professor Titchener excluded value from serious consideration in scientific psychology. According to him this science deals with strictly neutral facts just as does physics. It is quite possible that future generations will look back upon this period in utter perplexity.

One feels inclined to assume that in the minds of some scientists the situation caused uneasiness. If it did, such misgivings were soon dissipated by a remarkable doctrine which claimed that value could be explained on the basis of assumptions which never left the field of science. This achievement appeared possible in the framework of Darwin's theory of evolution. According to Darwin, characteristics of organic life which look as though they implied value can nevertheless be accounted for in terms of neutral facts. Presently an interpretation of values was proposed, and widely accepted, which applied the form of Darwin's reasoning to this further subject.

In Darwin's theory a species develops and improves its organs by accidental variations of germ cells, and by the early elimination of individuals who stem from cells with less fortunate variations. The elimination is brought about by the environment, in which the less fitting individuals die earlier. An extension of this principle to the case of value will take more or less this form: The equip-

ment of man as to mental tendencies is just as much a function of the germ cells as his anatomical characteristics are, and his equipment in this respect will vary when certain chance variations occur in those cells. Now, man is a social animal, and he will survive longer if he has mental tendencies which make him fit for life in a group. Thus in the remote past those individuals had the best chances who came from cells in which such tendencies were strongly preformed. The others died earlier and had fewer offspring. Nowadays, therefore, most people come from the better equipped stock. But what do we mean if we say that a man's mental tendencies favor his living and surviving in the group? Obviously we mean what are otherwise known as his moral attitudes with regard to others. They preserve the group, and through the group the individual himself.

We need not investigate whether the authors of the evolutionary theory of value believed that in this fashion value was actually deduced from categories of natural science. There is little doubt that the theory was generally understood in this sense, and that it still owes its great popularity among scientists to that claim. In actual fact, of course, the claim represents a remarkable instance of self-deception. Plainly, Darwin's theory derives biological phenomena from neutral facts only inasmuch as the conditions which accidentally vary in germ cells are, and refer to, such neutral facts. It may be that Darwin's strictly biological reasoning fulfills this prerequisite. But, surely, the same prerequisite is not fulfilled in the evolutionary theory of value. For if here dispositions for moral attitudes in group life emerge in germ cells, such curious newcomers have certainly no ancestry among the neutral facts which make up nature according to natural science. Dispositions of this kind may vary from one germ cell to another; but, if so, it is dispositions *for value* which vary; instead of being deduced from neutral facts, value *per se* is tacitly taken for granted and,without an explanation, simply added to such facts. Or does natural science give us any hint of how a neutral fact can become a disposition for value? In other words, merely the form of Darwin's reasoning is here preserved. This form causes the erroneous impression that the theoretical achievement is also the same, namely, the reduction of a puzzling phenomenon to principles of natural science.

This ought to have been clear almost *a priori*. In the scientific thesis that no value attribute applies to any facts of nature it is clearly implied that neutral facts and values are two sharply distinguishable genera. If this is right, how can any sequence of neutral facts, be it ever so long and complicated, have value as its end product? A theory which holds that this happens in evolution

must somewhere commit an error. To be sure, evolutionary theorizing may be able to explain that human conduct shows certain regularities, i.e., that under given conditions one activity rather than another is likely to follow. But as soon as human action implies "good," "bad," or "ought" we are dealing not with additional regularities of mere occurrences but with a new class of facts. Moreover, far from being influenced by philosophical prejudice, we make this sharp distinction because it is made so sharply in science. In fact, therefore, the scientists themselves ought to have been the first to object to the confusion of neutral fact and value which characterizes the evolutionary theory. Actually, the criticism which the theory so much deserves has come from philosophy. During the past forty years there has been a renaissance in the field of ethics, and more than one philosopher has made it clear that, wherever the error lies, if the evolutionary theory is accepted value is necessarily denaturalized. Evolution conceived as a sequence of changes in the hereditary make-up of our ancestors will never explain value. I wish to add that this statement holds quite generally. Although both the evolutionary theory and its critics have been principally interested in moral value, our argument against the theory holds for value in any sense, including its most modest specimen. And we may generalize still further. Quite apart from evolutionary theory, so long as the present strictly negative view of natural science with regard to value is maintained, no datum concerning the physical world, among others no fact of neurology or nerve physiology, can have any bearing upon the nature and the problems of value as such.

In the meantime it has proved impossible to exclude value from the investigations of at least one empirical discipline, namely, psychology. Many psychologists may never use the term. Value is none the less implicitly accepted inasmuch as after the gradual collapse of pure connectionism and conditionism *motivation* has been generally recognized as the central issue of psychological inquiry. Few will deny that in human subjects the goal of motivated behavior has value characteristics. Now, in our present argument this acceptance of value as an empirical subject appears little short of baffling. For if natural science acts as though the attribution of value to anything in nature would be almost a crime against the spirit of factual research, how can one form of empirical investigation ignore this view, and yet proceed with a considerable measure of success? It is quite true that psychology has long followed the orders of natural science; on the other hand, at the present time psychologists may not be fully aware of the fact that with their study of motivation they are out of bounds so far as natural science

is concerned. But it seems surprising that the transgression has no evil consequences. Neither law and order on the objective side nor exact procedure on the side of method appear endangered when motivation, and with it value, are freely included in empirical research.

To be sure, psychology has not yet shaken off the old fetters entirely. For the most part psychologists hold a view of value which is at odds with value experience, and must be caused by a prejudice. The prejudice, it appears, still has its roots in the unwillingness of science to admit value as an ingredient of objective situations. The now prevailing theories of motivation are *subjectivistic*, which implies that the interpretation of value in psychology is equally subjectivistic. It is widely taken for granted that all motivation originates in the self, and, as a result, value is generally said to be valuation, i.e., to spring from the self's subjective attitudes. Perry, for instance, whose theory is primarily a psychological theory, makes great efforts to prove that value is wrongly localized when it appears within objects.

I have often asked philosophers and psychologists who defend this subjectivistic view just why they are so insistent about this point. So far I have never received a satisfactory answer. Least of all do answers point to direct observations of value experiences. Behind the answers there always seems to lie some deep conviction which is never openly formulated. I am afraid the objective parts of human experience, more particularly our percepts, are for most of us so closely related to the world of natural science that the verdict against value in nature is inadvertently extended to the percepts. Even in their theoretical thought, few people can keep percepts and physical objects sharply separate. Consequently, since physics is regarded as a realm of purely neutral facts, percepts which in a numerical sense tend to be identified with physical entities can also never have value attributes. If percepts are not actually identified with physical objects they are at least interpreted as almost literal translations of patterns of physical stimuli into patterns of corresponding sensations. Nerve physiology seems to give an adequate account of the genesis of such sensations in terms of natural science, and thus it once more follows that in percepts there is no place for value. Apart from these, and closely related, arguments I can find no reason for the persistence with which the subjectivistic interpretation of value is still being defended. That part of our experience which we call the self—with its moods, efforts, emotions, and so forth—is not so closely related to nature as investigated by physicists and chemists. Therefore it does not

seem to matter if this entity is made responsible for value as merely one strange function among many others.

A time will probably come in psychology and philosophy in which it will be a principle of method that the obvious characteristics of primary observational data are to be respected at their face value, whatever their relation to general preconceptions may be. It will then be acknowledged that we are not allowed to interpret black as really white, and here as actually elsewhere, unless we are forced to do so by further convincing observations. The time in which this rule will be generally accepted is likely to be remote. But it can be brought nearer only by one attempt after another to do precisely what the rule demands. The rule asks for phenomenology.[2]

How, then, does value appear in common experience?

(1) It seems to be a fairly general fact that value appears as an attribute of things and events themselves rather than as an activity of the self or as the result of such an activity. We should therefore falsify our primary observational data if we were to say that the essence of value is valuation. Phenomenologically, value is located in objects and occurrences; it is not an action to which they are subjected. Value may reside in the most varied classes of things. A dress may look elegant or sloppy, a face hard or weak, a street cheerful or dismal, and in a tune there may be morose unrest or quiet power. I admit, one's own self is among the entities in which values may reside. Such is the case when we feel fit or, at another time, moody. But the thesis that it is always valuation as an act which imbues its object with value as a pseudo-attribute is perhaps nowhere more artificial than precisely in this instance. Here the self would have to equip itself with value attributes such as fitness or utter fatigue. The idea seems slightly fantastic. And if in this instance a thing *per se* manages to have value characteristics, why should we deny this possibility where other percepts are concerned?[3]

[2] To avoid misunderstanding it will here be necessary to add that phenomenology in the present sense differs from Husserl's technique. I do not believe that we are justified in putting certain phases of experience in brackets. A first account of experience ought to be given and carefully studied without selections of any kind. It is otherwise to be expected that even if the brackets are introduced as mere methodological tools, they will sooner or later turn out to be weapons of an ontological prejudice. In fact, I am not sure whether Husserl himself has not used them as such weapons.

[3] It will not be necessary to explain that the self, taken in the simple sense in which fitness or fatigue may temporarily become its attributes, *is* a particular percept; in other words, that it is neither the physical organism nor the epistemological ego of certain philosophies.

To repeat: For what reason are we to accept the thesis that value in objects can only be understood as an illusion, and that the truth of the matter consists in acts of the self which we wrongly objectify? There are instances in which the thesis would ask us to believe what is clearly impossible. Men sometimes succumb to what they would call the irresistible womanly charm of certain persons. Now, this is a value attribute on which women have a monopoly. It would be absurd to maintain that when the intensely male interests of such men impinge upon the actually neutral appearance of the women, female charm develops in these objects as an illusory projection of the males' conations. Female charm is not a component of such male conations. How, then, can it be projected? It has been said that in pure description value characteristics do reside in objects; that to this extent the objective location of those characteristics is not an illusion; but that they are nevertheless *caused* by conations of the self. This theory still rests on the tacit premise that it is more natural for value to spring from the self than to reside in things. And we can only ask again: Whence that premise? Moreover, even in this form, the act theory of value negates phenomenological evidence, particularly in the case of certain negative values. When suddenly an object looms dangerous and threatening it is not felt to have that appearance because there is first fear and a tendency to escape in the self. On the contrary, fear with that tendency is felt to be a consequence of the danger that threatens from the object. The theory is therefore at variance with experience.

It is merely a construction even in those instances in which value within the object actually varies with the intensity of the corresponding subjective need. It may well be that female charm is greatly enhanced when the sex need in a male has grown particularly strong. Does it follow that the sexual conation of the male self is responsible for that intensified perceptual value? If we say so we ignore another possibility. Glandular action (which is physiological action and not sexual conation as a psychological attitude) may have two parallel effects upon the nervous system. Those parts of the tissue whose states are correlated with phenomenal states of the self may become ready for processes that go with sexual conation. But in other parts which contain the correlates of perceptual objects such processes may at the same time be intensified as are the somatic counterparts of certain tertiary qualities. From this point of view the latter change would not be established *by* the conation but *together with* increased readiness for such conation. If it be asked why, say, in the case of sex that glandular action should emphasize just those *particular* characteristics of

certain percepts, the obvious answer is the other question: Why does the same physiological cause make the self ready for sexual conation rather than for any other conation? The former connection is not a bit more problematic than is the latter.[4]

It might be argued that a theory of value should not be concerned with mere percepts and their characteristics, since ultimately value must be referred to objective reality. But this argument seems to me mistaken. In the first place, if objective reality is meant as a synonym of the physical world, the scientific view which is at present generally held excludes any such consideration. According to this view there can be no value in objective reality. In the second place, we do not actually refer our moral obligations (or values in general) to the physical world. For all practical purposes we are naïve realists, and percepts are our real objects. It is quite true that in referring to the values of such objects we often go beyond perceptual fact. For everybody's percepts are equipped with characteristics which are matters of indirect knowledge rather than of sensory experience. This "thought content" of percepts, however, just like the content of other knowledge, is phenomenally objective. It is located within the percepts, and if it has value characteristics these, too, have an objective location. Incidentally, when images have value characteristics their value is also phenomenally objective. Images are not part of the self.

In concluding I should like to suggest that further interpretations of value in terms of valuating acts be accompanied by a statement of the premises which make the author prefer that interpretation to the testimony of value experience. It may be that once these premises were clear the preference itself would be greatly weakened.

(2) So far our phenomenology of value agrees with the descriptive accounts given by several philosophers in England although on the whole their accounts refer to specifically moral and valid value rather than to value in the generic sense. But if the same authors regard value *merely* as a quality which resides in objects they seem to me to ignore an important phase of their subject. It is true, to the extent to which value characteristics are located in things and events themselves, and need for their existence no activity of the self, a relational interpretation of value would be misleading. But when to this degree the independence of value is admitted we have not yet touched upon another side of value experience which we can not omit without unjustified abstraction.

[4] If for a moment we have here left the phenomenological realm we have done so because the view under discussion is itself a hypothetical construction.

Even though value does not depend upon acts of the self, it often is clearly referred to certain facts within the object which exhibits the value. Moreover, these facts are for the most part *relational* facts. Anybody who perceives a graceful object or gesture will on reflection admit that this is obviously true. Actually, the observation holds for most instances of value: A situation or an object is felt to be valuable with reference to certain structural characteristics of the situation or the object. In this sense Professor Ross appears to be right not only when he regards value as a "consequential" quality but also when he accepts Professor Urban's thesis that as a rule value adheres to a *Sachverhalt*. In this German term it is implied that the factual datum to which the value characteristic of a situation refers tends to be a structural or relational trait of this situation.

I find it difficult to decide whether the preceding statements concern merely frequent or actually necessary characteristics of value. But with regard to a further trait I have no such doubts. Professor Urban holds that value is not adequately described unless we mention what may be called a *demand* character that belongs to its very nature. The plus and the minus signs which are characteristic of all value do not solely indicate that value qualities as such lie in one direction or the opposite with regard to a neutral point. Rather the plus and minus also mean "to be accepted, reached, maintained, supported" and "to be avoided, eliminated, changed in the positive direction." I am not acquainted with values of which this is not true. No value attribute seems to deserve its name if it has no such demand character. Moreover, while natural science would hardly worry about any other qualities with which phenomenology chooses to deal, it is precisely this demand character of value, in a wide sense the "ought" or the "requiredness" in it, which science wants to exclude when it refuses to use any value terms in reference to its subject-matter. It is in contrast with any "ought" that facts of science are called *neutral* facts.

While therefore value can not simply be interpreted in relational terms, it nevertheless contains a reference beyond its existence as a quality and beyond the object in which it resides. This reference is dynamic. Now the act theory which we discussed in earlier paragraphs emphasizes such a dynamic ingredient in value. But while this theory tends to identify value with a "vector" which issues from the *self*, in actual experience it is first of all value in an *object* which goes with a demand. In other words, the vector issues from the object *qua* valuable. The dangerous object threatens, the cool drink is tempting, the problematic situation invites closer inspec-

tion, and so forth. Here again, therefore, we have to reverse the account which the act theory gives of value. It shall not be denied that the demand which issues from a value object is mostly, though perhaps not necessarily, directed toward the self, and that as a consequence the self is likely to become active toward, or away from, that object. In this case, it may rightly be said, vectors actually arise of which the self is the center. But as a rule this happens because in the first place there is a positive or negative demand in the object.

(3) We have just used the expression: "Value in an object goes with a demand." This expression is not quite adequate. Between the value as such and the demand there is more than a factual connection as though the demand merely accompanied the value characteristic. For, generally the attraction (or the negative vector) which issues from the object is felt to spring from the very nature of that value attribute. So far as I know it was W. Dilthey who first introduced the concept of understandable relationships. The eighteenth century was very fond of the term "reason." Reason was then considered as a mental faculty. At the present time we prefer to speak of rational or understandable relationships which are experienced within actual mental situations. By this we mean that a given content may be felt to be required by others. But there is one further point at which the rationalism of that period must be corrected. We often apprehend that one thing follows from another as its natural consequence not only in the strictly intellectual field but also in motivation, emotion, and value experience. An understandable relationship in thought may not in every respect be comparable with such a relation as experienced in those other instances. But, surely, the relation between anger and its object, or joy and the situation from which it springs, is also understandable in the sense that as a rule such emotions appear adequate with reference to the facts from which they derive. We should, for instance, feel it to be both against the nature of the emotions and their objects if the object of my joy were all at once, without a change of its character, to cause the emotion of anger. A relationship of precisely this type is meant if we say that demands which issue from value objects are felt to spring from the nature of those objects and their values. In other words, we understand it as sensible that we are attracted by objects which have certain characteristics, and that we are disgusted by others. These are not mere sequences; at least *prima facie* it is felt to be adequate that just such vectors issue from such objects. The limitation which is contained in the term "*prima facie*" refers, of course, to the possibility that on the level of valid value it may become an

obligation to resist such perfectly understandable demands. If this happens the relation between the value objects and their demands may nevertheless remain understandable in the present sense.

It is at this point that a remark about the problem of valid value obtrudes itself. Plainly, this problem is whether the demand which issues from a situation may be experienced not only as understandable but also as binding. If there are instances of this kind two further questions follow immediately: First, under what specific circumstances do understandable demands appear as binding? And, secondly, what in this connection is the meaning of the term "binding"? It is a serious blunder when in relativistic arguments such phenomenological questions are replaced by questions of inductive generality as though any problem of validity could be solved by counting how many people or tribes agree, or disagree, with certain judgments. Validity of a demand is quite compatible with factual dissension concerning the same demand. We see this every day in the purely cognitive field; but in this field of thought we draw no relativistic conclusions concerning the validity of logical demands. Even if it is to be granted that validity in thought is not throughout equivalent to validity, say, in ethics, the comparison shows that as a form of reasoning the relativistic arguments confuse two entirely different issues.

After this exploration of generic value as such we can now return to our main problem, the dualism of value and the neutral facts of natural science. So far it has been our impression that no bridge can span the gap between these two concepts. If this were actually true, value in any sense of the word would have jumped into our world from nowhere when the development of living organisms had reached a certain stage, namely, when percepts had for the first time inviting or forbidding value characters. In a period which is as eagerly concerned with unity of knowledge as ours is, this must appear as a disturbing thought. Nor does it help us if we are told that, after all, values are also facts, and that therefore we need not bother about the relation of facts and values. This is not a question of mere terms. If values are facts they are none the less facts of a peculiar kind. Otherwise why should natural science exclude this kind from its domain? Thus, if the scientists are right, the dualism as such remains in full force whether or not we subsume values under the category of facts.

We should perhaps be less disturbed by the dualism if value were only a quality of a particular kind. Quite apart from value attributes, a great many qualities of human experience are strangers in the world of natural science. Everybody seems to be resigned to the fact that even if these qualities may once gain a better place in the scheme of science than they now have, present thought appears utterly unable to imagine what that place could be. In this respect value characteristics *qua* qualities are hardly more enigmatic than sensory qualities such as green or gray. We will therefore not attempt to relate our first characteristic of value to the world

of science. It should, however, be remarked that if value characteristics were interpreted as projections of valuating acts, the qualitative differences among these acts would be just as puzzling to natural science as value qualities which reside in objects and events themselves.

The second and the third points of our description concern natural science more directly. For these points refer to structural characteristics of value rather than to mere qualities. If a demand issues from a thing and affects another, this is a structural fact; and if this demand is experienced to spring from the nature of its substratum, this is once more a matter of functional structure. Here science finds itself in a curious position. While it excludes value from nature it postulates at the same time that the structural characteristics of all functions in the world be interpretable in terms of physical facts. This will become clear if we once more return to the principle of evolution. Evolution has two sides. It is commonly regarded as a principle of *change,* because evolution has established one new anatomical condition after another. Much less clearly do we realize that evolution is just as much a principle of *invariance.* Not only are those new anatomical conditions supposed to have originated according to the old laws of nature in general, it is also nothing but the primordial basic processes of the physical world which according to the principle of evolution are still operating under the new conditions. It follows that no elementary functional structure can appear in organisms that is not derivable from the fundamental concepts of science. And this applies also to the structure of value. Now, so long as science declares that nature before evolution was devoid of value in any sense, no amount of new organs can give us an understanding of value in terms of natural science. So much we have seen in a preceding discussion. Therefore, since the structural characteristics of value are said to have been absent from nature to begin with, and since with this premise evolution as a principle of change can not be made responsible for those characteristics, we here find natural science contradicting itself. It adheres to evolution, i.e., to continuity and uniformity of all functions in the world. But it also denies any possibility of applying this principle in the case of value. We will next consider how science could extricate itself from this inconsistency.

It would, of course, be possible to sacrifice the principle of evolution. Then all difficulties would disappear excepting the one that the resulting dualism between neutral facts and value would destroy all hope that the unity of knowledge of which modern philosophers of science are so rightly fond will ever be achieved.

I can not believe that those philosophers or any scientists will be prepared to make such a sacrifice. But under these circumstances there is only one way out. Since, as a typical experience, value with its characteristic structure can not be eliminated, and since science postulates the unity of all functional structures, science will have to deliberate whether its own concepts do not admit of certain modifications. For as soon as science discarded the thesis that the functional characteristics of value are absent from nature, the inconsistency would disappear, the unity of knowledge would potentially be established, and evolution would become a principle which makes sense.

It is surprising to see how little such a step would affect science. There are two ways in which the necessary change can be discovered. We can either compare value situations with physical situations in general; or we can apply the same procedure to value situations and such particular situations in nature as are directly related to value experiences, namely, the somatic correlates of value situations in the brain of man. I prefer the second alternative. It will no longer be denied that any perceptual object is somatically represented by a cortical process, and that in each case this process is located in some particular part of the tissue. Similarly, the self in the sense in which we have used the term is represented by a complex of processes. We have every reason to assume that the location of this latter complex differs from that of a process which corresponds to an object. Now, in the case of a value situation the percept in question has qualities which make it valuable. These qualities as such we have decided not to discuss. But we have found that no such quality alone constitutes actual value, because all objects which are valuable are sources of positive or negative demands. For the most part these are demands upon the self, which they either attract or repel. If we ask ourselves what somatic facts in the tissue could be the correlates of such demands we are at once reminded of the physical concept "field." The field between two physical objects or processes extends from one to the other, and tends either to reduce or to widen their distance. The parallel is obvious. It is true, physicists vacillate between two interpretations of fields. Before Faraday fields were regarded as mere mathematical constructions; according to Faraday and Maxwell fields were the most important entities in nature; but at the present time there seems to be a certain reaction against this view, probably because the concept of fields can hardly be divorced from that of causation, which is now unpopular. If we wish to give the demands of valuable percepts physical counterparts in the brain we need do no more than adopt Faraday's view. Not only does a field

attract an entity toward, or repel it from, the source of the field—just as the self is affected by the demand of a value. That attraction or repulsion in a field is also independent of further conditions which, apart from the field, may be operating in the given situation. It has sometimes been said that we find nowhere in nature an analogue of the difference between "happens" and "is" on the one hand, and "ought" on the other hand. This is incorrect since any object in nature that is subjected to a field remains thereby directed toward, or away from, the source of the field, even when because of further conditions it may actually move in another direction.

We have still to decide what the somatic counterpart of another characteristic of value is: the demand of a value object is felt to *follow from* the nature of the object. Now we have just seen that it depends merely upon our choice between several, otherwise equally acceptable, interpretations of the concept field whether or not a value demand can be referred to a somatic correlate. Our situation is precisely the same when we turn to the understandable relation between the nature of value objects and their demands. According to natural science the relation between objects and their fields is a relation of mere fact. But this proves only that the procedures of science have access to no more than such a factual connection. Whether the relation is actually of this nondescript type, or whether, if more were known, the nature of the field would in each case prove to follow from the nature of the objects involved, this is a question which natural science alone can not answer. The issue simply lies beyond the possibilities of observation in physics. And, instead of excluding the latter alternative, science ought to say merely: I am unable to decide. We are therefore again at liberty to choose the interpretation which appears on the whole more satisfactory. In doing so we can never come into conflict with scientific data because these data are not affected by our decision. Obviously, our choice will be such as to do justice to the nature of value, to establish the unity of knowledge, and to abolish the inconsistency in which science is now caught. This means that on the evidence of phenomenology we shall interpret the relation of objects and their fields as one of *following from*. With this choice value situations as experienced and corresponding functional situations in the brain of man become structurally congruent.

It takes some courage to suggest that phenomenological observation be here accepted as evidence in matters of nature. But once the principle of evolution is taken for granted such an attitude appears perfectly natural when we deal with problems of functional structure. We readily admit that as to quantitative exactness and

in the establishment of strict factual laws the observational techniques of science achieve incomparably more than can be gained from phenomenology. But when we ask to precisely what relations these laws refer, then natural science is at the end of its resources, and restricts itself to noncommittal terms which just cover its own data. This is our starting point. We try to relate the phenomenology of value situations with corresponding somatic situations, and find that a demand extends from a value object to the self just as a field in the brain would issue from an object process and affect the somatic correlate of the self. So far natural science can have no cause for objections. If then science assumes an agnostic attitude with regard to the particular relation between objects and their fields, any other evidence which fills the empty space must be welcomed. It happens that phenomenology sees more of that relation than is implied in the terms of least content which science likes to use. Under these circumstances, why should one further insist on an agnostic attitude?

Not even the parsimonious tendency of science offers an excuse. For it is not an important parsimony that tries to keep the number of data in the limited realm of natural science at a minimum. The clear, unitary system of knowledge as a whole is far more essential, and any schism in this respect must be regarded as a most undesirable expense. There is, moreover, one expense which this systematic parsimony of human thought simply can not afford, and that is self-contradiction. Only the present suggestion seems to be capable of avoiding that expense where the relation of fact and value is concerned.

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FACTS AND VALUES IN ECONOMICS[1]

I SHALL state in the first place what I take to be the facts concerning the past and present practices of economists in treating value, and add my own evaluation of these practices. My second theme is the subtle way in which an economist's personal hierarchy of values affects his factual conclusions. Under this head I shall explain why "wishful thinking" is more prevalent in the social than in the natural sciences, and dispense practical advice on the best ways of guarding against it. Third, I shall conclude with some observations on the relations of economics to its sister sciences in dealing with both facts and values.

[1] Read at a Symposium on "Value in a World of Fact" at the Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences, New School for Social Research, November 28, 1943.

I

The place held by value theory in economics has undergone a revolution within the last half century.

In 1890 Alfred Marshall published his *Principles of Economics,* which rapidly won the place that had been held in successive generations by the great treatises of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill. Marshall based his whole system upon a theory of value. He thought of economic conduct as governed by two opposing sets of motives, the force of which can be measured in money. On one side are ranged our wants, which diminish in intensity as consumption proceeds. Wants impel us to demand consumers' goods. The force of these motives can be represented by demand curves, which show the prices at which varying quantities of specified goods will be bought in given markets during given periods. Pushing us in the opposite direction are our disinclinations to labor and to wait, which grow in intensity as labor and waiting are prolonged. These motives limit the quantities of goods we are willing to produce. Their force can be represented by supply curves, which show the prices that must be paid to get varying quantities of specified goods in given markets during given intervals. The selling price of a good settles at the point where the quantity demanded equals the supply offered—that is, at an intersection of the demand and supply curves.

This theory of wants and efforts, satisfactions and sacrifices, demand and supply, values and prices, Marshall applied to intervals so brief that supply can be regarded as fixed, intervals long enough to allow increase of supply by fresh production, intervals long enough to allow increase of facilities for production, and finally intervals long enough to allow change in the factors of production and the evolution of wants—though he did not actually carry out in detail the last part of his plan. Further, Marshall extended his analysis of value and prices to the factors of production—the services of land, labor, capital, and entrepreneurs, thereby making his account of production and distribution a section of his fundamental value theory. By thus developing a supply and demand explanation of the value and prices of *all* goods, Marshall succeeded in integrating his system more firmly than any of his classical predecessors. A theory of valuation starting with the wants that incite us to efforts and the sacrifices that hold us back is the cornerstone of his whole edifice.

Scatteringly before and cumulatively after Marshall presented this imposing edifice to the public, critics began questioning the solidity of its cornerstone. Darwin's emphasis upon instincts,

the emphasis of William James and other psychologists upon habits, undermined confidence in the older conception of conduct as guided by calculation. The reliability of introspection was discounted as experimental methods spread. Thorstein Veblen made sport of the hedonistic psychology which was explicitly used by Jevons in his analysis of utility, and which was implicit in Marshall's tamer phrasing. Henry W. Stuart pushed the criticism home in more orthodox language. Younger iconoclasts followed suit. Before long economists were brought to realize that the psychological notions with which their masters worked were out of date—gravely doubted or flatly repudiated by those who were supposedly the best judges of such matters.

That realization raised an awkward question. If economic theory rested on a theory of value, and this theory was insecure, how could economists shore up their tottering edifice?

Some anxious souls ransacked modern psychological literature seeking a sounder theory of valuation. They did not find what they wanted in a form they could borrow.

Others, among whom Z. C. Dickinson was notable, endeavored to show that the psychological notions genuinely basic to economic theorizing were not so fallible as the critics made out. Dickinson's book on *Economic Motives* was comforting; but a systematic defense of the old position raised more doubts than it settled.

A third course, and the one which won most favor, was to argue that the theory of prices developed by economists does not after all depend for its validity upon the underlying theory of valuation. Somehow men choose among goods. Their choices imply scales of preference, which can be represented by demand curves or schedules, or, more innocently, by "indifference curves." Let the economist accept these schedules or curves as *data*, not to be inquired into, and build upon them his explanation of prices, including the prices of the factors of production. The price theories will remain valid, whatever account may be given by others of the process by which men arrive at their valuations.

This line was taken with variations in statement by Pareto, Cassel, Fetter, Davenport, and others. It has become the prevailing fashion of the day among economic theorists. Marshall's cornerstone is rejected by later builders. The theory of valuation is handed over to psychologists, philosophers, or any other group of workers who think themselves competent to deal with it.

But, while he discards his old theory of valuation, the economic theorist keeps finished valuations as his basic "facts." They are facts only in a Pickwickian sense. The theorist does not himself ascertain men's preferences by empirical inquiry; he merely sup-

poses them to have been ascertained. This practice saves a vast deal of labor. It also opens the door wide to interesting speculations. Supposed facts can be set up in a wide variety of patterns, which present a corresponding variety of problems in price determination. For example, by the use of assumptions fitted to the purpose, price theory has been extended since Marshall's day over the field of what is now tersely called "imperfect competition."

Convenient as is this modern fashion, it has serious disadvantages. First and most obvious, it means that economic theory moves on a more superficial level than in its more confident days. The theorist works with data he does not profess to explain. Of course, no science accounts for all the matters with which it deals; but each strives to delve ever deeper into its problems. To reverse this process and become more superficial is not pleasant. Economists did not impose on themselves the statute of limitations ruling out the theory of valuation because they liked to do so. They will repeal the statute as soon as they think they can make some progress toward understanding men's choices.

I believe that even now they are learning how to attack this fundamental problem with good prospects of success. It is not in their abstract theorizing, but in their dealings with concrete observations that progress is discernible. Let me list a few examples.

Advertising is meant to alter the preferences and paying dispositions of the public. In studying this activity, economists deal with objective data concerning the effectiveness of many devices for influencing valuations. They have an opportunity to gain insight into the processes by which the public arrives at its choices among the goods urged upon them.

Personnel management aims to heighten the efficiency of workers by a wide variety of schemes ranging from adjustments of lighting to incentive wages. In studying experiments in this field, economists, often in coöperation with men trained in other sciences, deal with the old problem of the irksomeness of labor in a more objective and constructive way.

Family budgets show that expenditures for food, clothing, housing, amusement, education, etc., and the percentage of income saved change in different ways as income increases. These statistical data demonstrate objectively mass valuations made under differing conditions, from which properly equipped investigators can draw warranted conclusions of significance for both theory and practice.

James C. Bonbright's two-volume treatise on *The Valuation of Property* is the best example I know of recent economic work on the theory of value. Bonbright has excellent materials—the

valuations put on pieces of property by courts, public service commissions, etc., accompanied by explanations of the way the decisions were made. Processes akin to those we perform casually in our daily lives are writ large in these documents, with their characteristic rationalizations, uncertainties, and dependence upon the prevailing prices of goods other than the one being valued at the moment. The economist who wishes to control the treacherous method of introspection in his thinking about valuation will find Bonbright's materials and analyses highly suggestive.

Finally, I venture to mention an investigation not yet completed that bears directly upon consumers' valuations. C. Reinold Noyes is utilizing the experimental work of physiologists, neurologists, and psychologists to get a view of the body-mind in process of satisfying its basic biological needs. Passing on to processes in which associative memory plays a part, he is developing the implications of his physiological findings for the economic theory of valuation. Noyes' venture is one of those efforts to make different sciences cross-fertilize one another, for which we hear many pleas, but of which we see too few examples.

To conclude this theme with certain value judgments of my own: I think economists were wise in dropping their old theories of value, based at first or second remove upon the naïve psychological notions that Jeremy Bentham codified in his felicific calculus. But the policy of dispensing with a theory of value seems to me unhappy and unnecessary. When economists deal realistically with human behavior, they find themselves needing, and trying with some measure of success, to understand how people evaluate goods. Often investigators can find materials that suggest hypotheses susceptible of objective testing. Out of such researches, and with the aid of sister sciences, I hope for and expect a renascence of value theory in economics.

Having indulged in this bit of conscious and virtuous wishful thinking, I turn to my second theme—vicious wishful thinking.

II

In all scientific research, an investigator's personal equation influences his results. The rôle played by this factor varies inversely as the impersonal controls to which results can be subjected. The natural sciences have a great advantage over the social sciences in this respect. When reasoning is checked by experiments that can be repeated at will, the findings of different observers can be compared, and a high degree of probability attached to the conclusions drawn from their joint efforts. Pre-

sumably, social scientists can reason as logically as their natural brothers, but opportunities for testing their hypotheses by observation under controlled conditions are restricted. Even their opportunities for observing what happens in the actual run of things have been limited by the paucity of mass observations. Hence their habit has been to set up simplified conditions in their imaginations, and draw conclusions about what would happen in an unreal world—conclusions that can not be refuted by an appeal to actual experience. But conclusions that can not be thus refuted can not be thus confirmed.

This situation gives social scientists as wide a license as any poet could ask. Since their conclusions are seldom subjected to trial by fact, their personal equations can run riot with a freedom unknown in the experimental sciences. Economists have the reputation of differing endlessly from one another; and sometimes exult perversely in their differences. By setting up assumptions chosen for the purpose, they can demonstrate on the speculative plane almost any conclusion they wish. Such exercises have their uses in exploring many fields of knowledge, provided the explorer realizes what he is doing. But they become dangerous to him when he treats a speculative conclusion as established in fact, and dangerous to others when he proffers advice on matters of policy. One of the besetting sins of economists is failure to recognize the distinction between an hypothesis and a theory. They forget Mill's warning that "The ground of confidence in any concrete deductive science is not the *a priori* reasoning itself, but the accordance between its results and those of observation *a posteriori*." Many an economist is ready to speak on practical issues as one having the authority of science, although he has made no serious effort to verify his conclusions inductively. Of course, any citizen is justified in sharing his "hunches" with others. Perhaps an economist's hypotheses on matters within his field are likely to be better "hunches" than those of the man on the street; but when he urges people to act on one of his hypotheses he is in duty bound to state in all candor that it is merely an untested opinion.

I am not insinuating that there is much trifling or much conscious malpractice among economists. Most economists, I assure you, want to get at the facts of life, and most of them are honest. But not being held down by testing, they deceive themselves as readily as "natural philosophers" used to deceive themselves before experimental checking became standard practice. Moreover, they deal with matters about which all men, including themselves, feel intensely. It is harder to be objective when discussing wages and profits than when discussing stars and electrons.

I like to divide the blame for economists' self-deceptions between the unconscious hidden within each of us, and the semi-conscious that is developed by the conditions under which our minds are formed. Every economist can see in certain of his fellows the unhappy effects of a personal or a class bias. Of course it is harder to see these biases in ourselves—though we realize they must be present in our make-up, and at times we admit the justice of Simkhovitch's caustic remark that "our theories are fig leaves worn to conceal our passions."

The best way to guard against the danger of doing wishful thinking in economics is to frame assumptions in such fashion that either they, or the conclusions deduced from them, can be tested by appeal to factual records. This type of work requires careful advance planning of every investigation, knowledge of the observations that have been or can be made, and familiarity with the technique of interpreting such evidence—especially the methods of statistical inference.

I hope and expect that economic research will take this realistic direction more generally in the future than it has in the past. The rapidly expanding scope of economic statistics favors such development, and so also does the rapid improvement in our tools for making better observations and for extracting significant conclusions from them.

If my hopes and expectations are realized, economists will be able to check one another's work more effectively in the future, and the differences among their conclusions will shrink to a narrower range. I know from painful examples that this safeguard against wishful thinking is far from perfect; but as we subject ourselves to the hard discipline of dealing with actual experience we shall grow in ability to amend or confirm one another's findings.

A further advantage of realistic work is that it will lead us to profit more by coöperating with men trained in other disciplines—which brings up my third and last theme, the relations of economics to its sister sciences.

III

So long as economists deal mainly with speculation about what would happen in a simplified world created for their own purposes and existing only in their imaginations, they are not likely to contribute greatly to, or to learn much from, the work of other investigators. But when they come out of their closets into the actual world, conditions change. Then they have to study the behavior of the same creatures that physiologists, psychologists,

psychiatrists, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, philosophers, historians, and ethicists are studying from other angles. The actual economic man has a neuro-muscular system, habits, emotions, an unconscious, a culture, a family, a political orientation, a *Weltanschauung,* ancestors, and duties. Though it is useful to look at this complex creature from many angles, he remains a unit the distinguishable characteristics of which influence one another. The better rounded the view a specialist can get of man, the better a specialist he is likely to become.

When economists thus deal with problems of practice they gain a vivid realization of their need of help from other sciences, and of the contributions they can make in return. In my experience, social scientists do not achieve a real meeting of minds by coming together and talking at one another about scientific methods or any other topic of common interest. But when several of them begin working together upon a genuine problem of human behavior, each member of the group finds he has much to learn and something to teach. Cross-fertilization of minds is best effected "on the job."

There are no simon-pure economic valuations, and there are no simon-pure economic facts. That condition of affairs has long been recognized formally by men of my craft; but we have only vague notions about the non-economic components in behavior and can gain clear ideas about them best from men of other specialties. In proportion as we learn anything of real significance about either facts or values in the economic sphere, we can pay for whatever we borrow.

These remarks apply to our personal value schemes as definitely as they apply to the valuations we study. Nothing I have said about the dangers of wishful thinking in the social sciences implies that we should, or could, divest ourselves of aims, ideals, or social aspirations. On the contrary, we should endeavor to make these notions as intelligent and as noble as possible. The more we learn about other aspects of behavior than those which concern us professionally, the better we are likely to succeed in forming serviceable ideals. And the more clearly we think about what we should like to see happen, the less likely we are to confuse these conscious wishes with our conclusions about what is. Our ultimate aim, if I may express a final value judgment, should be to contribute all that in us lies toward realizing in practice the highest social values we are able to conceive.

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BOOK REVIEW

The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson. ADRIENNE KOCH. (Woodbridge Prize Essay. 1942–43. Columbia Studies in American Culture, Number 14.) New York: Columbia University Press. 1943. xiv + 208 pp. $2.50.

This timely and important piece of research in American philosophy well deserves the Woodbridge Prize. It appears at a time when American thinkers have been driven back to ponder the sources of our national existence, and when they are puzzled, not only about the characteristic ideals of our civilization, but about the ways in which ideals in general can be made effective in action here and now. Thus Thomas Jefferson becomes a natural point of reference for contemporary thought. For Jefferson was an American moral and political philosopher who succeeded in combining an intense practicality with an unshakable moral idealism. As a people, however, we have found it easier to pay him the tribute of expansive adulation than that of thorough understanding. His great phrases have been so familiar that they have hardly seemed appropriate objects of research. Furthermore, we are only gradually emerging from what John Dewey has called "a kind of intellectual parochialism which induces us to turn to political philosophers of the old world who do not measure up to the stature of our own political thinkers—to say nothing of their remoteness from our own conditions." With our notorious penchant for going from one extreme to the other, we shall be fortunate to avoid the opposite sort of parochialism in the immediate future.

Miss Koch's monograph is a balanced corrective for both kinds of extremism. She rejects the protests of those whose conception of the nature of philosophy is so rigidly formal and traditional that they deny to Jefferson not only the title of "philosopher" but even the lesser appellation of "*philosophe.*" She grants, of course, that he does not belong among the philosophers of "the great tradition." His root ideas were not in substance original with him, nor were they firmly combined to constitute a system of sufficient scope or internal consistency to deserve a place in the technical histories of philosophy. But if ever a man lived who was philosophically-minded, in that he sought earnestly to bring his own wide reflections and those of others to bear upon social action, Thomas Jefferson was that man. He was both more and less than a philosopher, as Professor Schneider has said, "for he was much more concerned in being enlightened than in preaching enlightenment." Charges that he was but an unoriginal "middleman of

ideas," and not a philosopher, sound especially hollow in the mouths of those whose only claim to the title is the fact that they happen to be college teachers of the subject.

It is high time that we stopped patronizing Jefferson, on the one hand, and blindly worshiping him, on the other. We know that he was supremely gifted as a statesman who could fuse and "institutionalize" (in Justice Frankfurter's phrase) principles which had hitherto remained scattered in theoretical form, and which have been living forces ever since. He did not compose philosophical treatises; he lived a philosophical life, scattering his observations in literally thousands of letters and state papers and committee reports and drafts. As the author remarks: "To learn where his ideas came from (so far as is now possible), to learn first just what those ideas were, to begin to see the connections among them is to find his philosophy" (p. xii).

The task was impeded by the lack of a complete edition of Jefferson's works and letters, now happily in prospect, estimated to amount to over twenty-one million words. Miss Koch made a diligent search of the available sources, but no study at the moment can lay claim to being definitive. As Professor Chinard, who is the pioneer in the field, has pointed out, we need much more information than we have at present concerning the state of knowledge in the colonies, and the intellectual channels which were open between Virginia and both England and France. Jefferson was a skilful borrower, taking it for granted that his learned correspondents would assume that the commerce of ideas was carried on in tokens coined by many authors. So we may expect that there will continue to be revelations concerning the sources of many of his detailed arguments in the years to come. While the present study was in press, Professor Chinard [1] called attention to the Sage of Monticello's dependence, in compiling his syllabi of the doctrines of Jesus and of Epicurus, and in his long correspondence with John Adams, upon Enfield's so-called abridgment of Brucker's *Historia critica philosophiae,* unmentioned by Miss Koch.

The author divides her study into three parts of unequal length: the first devoted to Jefferson's ethics; the second, to his "philosophy and ideology"; and the third, almost as long as the first two combined, to his theory of society. This method of treatment has many advantages, but it leads to some repetition and occasionally to loss of orientation in time. The latter danger is heightened by the vast disproportion in our knowledge of Jeffer-

[1] Gilbert Chinard, "Jefferson Among the Philosophers," *Ethics,* Vol. LIII (1943), pp. 255–268.

son's sources in his later and earlier years. Written records of his first four decades are as scant as those of his last four are copious. The result is a standing temptation to read back into his youth what really belongs to his mature years. In his formative period, we may be fairly sure that he was trying hard "to formulate a moral pattern, for both public and private affairs, joining the basic art of living well and living wisely to the special art of good government" (pp. 1–2). In the process, he sat at the feet of many masters: the Epicureans, the Stoics, Bolingbroke, the Scottish intuitionists, Kames, and Priestley as the humanistic interpreter of the New Testament. The result was a human morality rooted in natural piety, but full of theoretical loopholes.

At this point it is easy to become confused over Jefferson's "flounderings" among the moralists, and miss the point that he was always saved from disaster by a firm and practical belief in the essential goodness of free and educated men. It is unfortunate that the author's chapter on Jefferson's "Morals and Religion" is separated by nearly a hundred pages from her chapter on "Natural Rights." For the two are intimately connected. Jefferson, the foe of clericalism in all its forms, was a devotedly religious man; and both his ethics and politics rest upon a foundation which is no less religious for its vigorous rejection of the non-natural. His own statement of this "natural religion" as the basis of his moral criterion for judging political systems is both incomplete and cluttered with the debris of deistic theology. From the point of view of Jefferson's methodology of science, his deism may "seem like a slip"; but that he allowed his faith in man to "go further than his facts," or thought that his facts went further than they did in supporting his faith, there can be little doubt (pp. 103–104). Jefferson, despite his triumphs in personal practice, can hardly be said to have succeeded theoretically in "establishing a continuity" between his moderate scientific materialism and "his great personal and ethical ideal of divine and human benevolence." It remains to be seen whether the latter can be founded upon a positivism that is less religious than Jefferson's.

As for more specifically philosophical influences, Jefferson wrote to John Adams in 1820: "I consider Dugald Stewart and [Destutt de] Tracy as the ablest metaphysicians living; by which I mean investigators of the thinking faculty of man" (p. 49). He may, as the author points out, "have realized the complementary character" of Scottish realism and French ideology, in that what the analysis of the latter refined away, the dogmatism of the former restored (p. 89). Both philosophies claimed descent from Bacon and were professedly "anti-metaphysical," which seems to have

meant "primarily anti-Descartes, medieval rationalism, 'spiritualism.'" Both held the "biological" theory of knowledge to be closely connected with social action; and both made a virtue of avoiding the insoluble problems of pure speculation, as had the Encyclopedists. Jefferson went so far as to act as the ideologists' American "proselytizer, translator, editor, sponsor for publication, and general representative in behalf of Tracy's author's rights"; but in philosophy as in politics he was a poor party man, who remarked, "If I could not go to heaven but with a party, I would not go there at all" (pp. 56, 89). In Miss Koch's opinion, "Jefferson is closer to the biological, individual approach to nature and the universe than to any mechanical or physical one." Thus his "veneration for tolerance of difference in society was indeed deep-seated in his habitual thought" (p. 112).

When we come to Jefferson's views on human nature, we find that "the predominant influences came from eighteenth-century France" in the positivism of men like Cabanis and Tracy. But he supplemented these formal conceptions of psychology by observations of his own. The latter are not the products of "a heady idealism," but are infused with sober hope concerning the educability of man. He fully recognized that many men (but not fourteen out of fifteen) are rogues; and that their existence calls for eternal vigilance on the part of honest folk (pp. 113–119). In her discussion of Jefferson's modification of the doctrine of natural rights, the author points to "the strategical importance of the right to self-government" as consisting in its "*sine qua non* function. No other rights (life, property, happiness) can be realized in society unless one has the power to initiate, change, alter, abolish, or limit governing power." Natural rights are thus claims based upon organic needs which are equally felt by all individuals: "to live, to sustain life, and to have freedom of motion (including the rights of assemblage and expatriation), and, above all, of thought and expression." International relations are by no means exempt from these natural standards of morality (pp. 143–145). In contrast to Professor Chinard, Miss Koch attaches little importance to Jefferson's doctrine of reserved natural rights set forth in his brief *Reflections on the Articles of Confederation*, and claimed by Chinard to constitute "the key to the whole democratic system of government evolved by Jefferson and the solution of the apparent contradictions often pointed out in his system."[2] She devotes an entire chapter, however, to Jefferson's theory of "wards," one of his "most significant and original ideas for implementing representative democracy."

[2] Gilbert Chinard, *Thomas Jefferson*, 1929, p. 82.

In her assessment of "The Perennial Significance of Jefferson's Thought," the author remarks that our third President was evidently convinced that "society will have its revolutions. Why not build society, then, in a manner which would encourage only those political revolutions which are in accord with consent—the people's consent, majority revolutions?" These take time: "the ground of liberty," wrote Jefferson, "is to be gained by inches." Sometimes reason is swept aside on the grand scale, and then liberty must be fought for; even "were there but an Adam and Eve left in every country, and left free," the price would not be too great (pp. 187–188). Miss Koch, however, chooses to conclude her study on the lesser Baconian note of ideology put into practice in the service of mankind's material estate. What gives greatness to the philosophy of Thomas Jefferson is not his eudæmonism or his utilitarianism, but his vision of freedom for the many to be achieved by "the cultivation of science as an act of religious duty."

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NOTES AND NEWS

La Section de Philosophie, Faculté des Lettres, École Libre des Hautes Études, New York City, held a meeting in memory of Léon Brunschvicg on April 1, 1944. M. Jacques Maritain presided and the speakers were as follows: Professors Marcel Barzin, Georges Gurvitch, Horace Kallen, Alexandre Koyré, Cornelius Krusé, F. S. C. Northrop, J. H. Randall, Jr., Georges De Santillana, Paul Schrecker, Paul Vignaux, Jean Wahl, Harry Wolfson. It is planned to publish the addresses.